Proportional representation without multiparty politics

I have a new essay with John Ketcham, “Reforming Big-City Elections.” In it, we argue that the two-party system makes its own case for party-list-based forms of proportional representation. Our argument differs from the usual one based on Duverger’s law.

In the classic argument, “winner take all” elections are the main barrier to multiparty politics. “Winner take all” here means an electoral system based either on single-seat districts or an allocation rule that can let a district’s largest faction win every seat. With such rules, the voter has three options: back a frontrunner, spoil, or stay home. From this perspective, anything not winner-take-all is a step forward.

We break with the classic argument by taking two-party politics as our point of departure. Our case runs as follows. The two-party system is inherently factional. Electoral reform at the state/local level tends to activate that factionalism. Often, this means building coalitions that straddle the Democratic/Republican divide. Because such coalitions are prone to split, electoral reforms should contain tools for mitigating that tendency: party lists.

We also resuscitate an old argument for multi-seat districts: aggregating votes over larger areas than is possible under single-seat or otherwise small districts.

Our argument can be seen as counterintuitive. If one views “independent politics” as the opposite of “two-party system,” reforms that join politicians’ fates (like lists) become nonstarters. However, the fluidity of “independent politics” is precisely why one might want such institutions, relative to other reform options.

The paper contributes to what I might call a literature on electoral-reform realism. Other key points from this genre include calls to lean into factionalism, calls to base electoral reform on the party system as it exists, and the observation that reform might be used to counter party-system nationalization.

Have a look!

This post also appeared on voteguy.com.